Using fi xed-effects models of state corporate income tax (SCIT) revenues that account for the endogeneity of apportionment formula weights and tax rates, we fi nd that states with a doubleweighted sales factor experience lower SCIT revenues than do states with an equally-weighted sales factor, while higher statutory tax rates are associated with higher SCIT revenues. We also fi nd that several other tax policies have statistically and economically signifi cant associations with SCIT revenues. Use of a throwback rule and defi ning business income more broadly are associated with higher SCIT revenues, while combined reporting surprisingly is not signifi cantly associated with SCIT revenues.
INTRODUCTION
S tate corporate income tax (SCIT) revenues have decreased over the past twenty-fi ve years relative to other sources of state tax collections (Wilson, 2006; Sullivan, 2007) . As Figure 1 shows, SCIT revenues declined by about 50 percent over the 21-year period, 1982-2002 , whether scaled by total state tax collections, federal corporate taxable income, or gross state product. In fact, many states currently raise more revenue from lotteries or tobacco and gasoline excise taxes than from the corporate income tax. Economists note with puzzlement that the decline coincides with increasing corporate profi ts as a share of national income (Cornia et al., 2005) , and deviates from the trend in federal corporate income tax revenues. 1 The decline of the SCIT has sparked an active debate as to its likely causes and potential remedies (Pomp, 1998; Fisher, 2002; Fox and Luna, 2002; Hofmann, 2002; Mazerov, 2003a; Cornia et al., 2005; Wilson 2006; Mazerov, 2007a; Sullivan, 2007) .
The leading causes suggested for the relative decline in SCIT revenues include: 1) changes in the federal income tax Empirical Evidence on the Revenue Effects of State Corporate Income Tax Policies rules and aggressive federal income tax planning, both of which affect federal taxable income (the typical starting point for computing the SCIT); 2) changes in organizational form, especially the increased use of fl ow-through entities whose income is typically not included in the corporate income tax base and which are widely used in state tax planning strategies; and 3) changes in the economy resulting from a shift away from manufacturing to services and technology for which the extant design of state tax systems is arguably obsolete (Brunori, 2002; Hofmann, 2002; Tannenwald, 2002; Florida Senate Committee on Finance, 2003; Cornia et al., 2005; Bankman, 2007) . A concurrent development over the past quarter century has been the increasing use of the SCIT as an instrument of economic development charged with attracting business and jobs into states, and only secondarily as a means of raising revenue to meet state budget needs. With economic development as an objective, state legislators have actively sought to implement policies to differentiate the structure of their state's SCIT from that of other states, adding another candidate to the list of likely explanations for the revenue decline.
In this study we focus on this development and examine the role of tax policies used by states to measure, allocate/apportion and tax corporate income in explaining the pattern of SCIT collections over the two decades from . During this period, while SCIT revenues relative to overall economic activity measures have generally trended downwards, experiences between states have differed markedly, with some states recording stable revenues as a share of total tax collections, and some even showing revenue increases Year
(1) Median state corporate income tax revenues relative to total state tax collections
(2) Median state corporate income tax revenues relative to federal corporate taxable income from corporations domiciled in the state
(3) Median state corporate income tax revenues relative to gross state product Note: Values for the median proportion of state corporate income tax revenues to gross state product (3), are multiplied by ten to facilitate easy comparison of trends over time with measures (1) and (2) ( (Cornia et al., 2005) . These differing state experiences suggest that factors likely to affect all states similarly, such as changes in the federal tax base or macroeconomic fl uctuations, probably cannot fully explain the SCIT revenue decline. Further, during this period many states changed their tax structures, particularly the factor weights in their apportionment formula and the statutory tax rate. We believe that focusing on the role of state-level differences in the structure of the SCIT is critical to the policy debate, in part because the extant empirical research on the declining SCIT phenomenon and its potential causes is sparse. The studies that exist focus on the apportionment formula and the effects of changing the weights placed on the factors used in this formula on economic activity, such as employment (e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000) and investment (e.g., Gupta and Hofmann, 2003) , and on fi rms' incentives to engage in tax planning (e.g., Gupta and Mills, 2002) . To be sure, some studies have also examined the effect of apportionment formula differences on state tax revenues (e.g., Klassen and Shackelford, 1998; Edmiston, 2002; Edmiston and Arze, 2006) . Although this attention is well deserved given the primacy of formula apportionment in determining the SCIT and the frequency of changes made in the formula's factor weights, state tax codes differ in many other respects as well, notably in the defi nition of the tax base and in various accounting policies that affect the calculation of taxable income. Recent studies have begun to broaden the enquiry to include factors such as tax incentives (Fisher, 2002) and the increased use of fl ow-through entities (Fox and Luna, 2005) in explaining the revenue decline. Yet, ambiguities remain because of confl icting results, failure to consider all of the relevant structural differences, and methodological issues, prompting calls for further research (Cornia et al., 2005) .
We contribute to this line of research in two ways. First, we address one of the largest methodological challenges facing all studies in this area-endogeneity between SCIT revenues and state tax policies, specifi cally apportionment formula weights and tax rates. Tax policies are not randomly assigned. Instead, each state's policymakers identify revenue needs and sources differently depending on a variety of variables, including historical factors, natural resources, economic opportunities, education systems, and political affi liations of elected offi cials. Over time these variables have combined to shape each SCIT system, while each SCIT system has also likely had an impact on some or all of these variables. More immediately, policymakers consider revenue needs when defi ning the tax base, the accounting policies used to determine the base, and the tax rates used to compute state corporate income tax liability. Thus, state tax policies are likely endogenous with state corporate tax revenues. Unlike previous studies, we explicitly attempt to mitigate this problem with a two-stage least squares approach to account for the endogeneity of apportionment formula weights and tax rates in SCIT revenue regressions.
Second, we comprehensively examine whether, and to what extent, a broad array of state tax policy choices affects SCIT revenues. Thus, our analysis also considers cross-state differences in the defi nition of the tax base, such as whether the state utilizes the throwback rule or requires unitary (or combined) reporting, and in various other tax policies, such as net operating loss carryback provisions, defi nition of business income, deductibility of federal income taxes, imposition of the alternative minimum tax, and state policies relating to passive investment companies.
We use aggregate state-level panel data covering the years 1982-2002 from a variety of public sources to estimate fi xed-effects regression models of SCIT revenues that control for unquantifi able and/or unobservable state-or year-specific characteristics that may influence the level of SCIT revenue collected. The models we employ also include controls for tax planning through organizational form, federal tax base changes and other general macroeconomic trends. We fi nd that controlling for the endogeneity of apportionment formula weights in models of corporate tax revenues is crucial; once appropriate controls are introduced, higher weights on the sales factor in the apportionment formula are associated with lower SCIT revenues. With respect to tax rates we fi nd that controlling for endogeneity does not materially affect inferences; higher statutory corporate income tax rates are associated with higher SCIT collections in models with or without such controls. Specifically, we find that states with a sales factor weight of one-half (a "double-weighted" sales factor) have 16-18 percent lower SCIT revenues on average than do states with a sales factor weight of one-third (an "equally-weighted" sales factor), while a one percentage point higher statutory tax rate is associated with 11-12 percent higher SCIT revenues.
With respect to the effects of other state tax policies, we fi nd that the use of a throwback rule, disallowance of net operating loss carrybacks, and the use of a broader defi nition of business income have a positive and generally signifi cant association with SCIT collections. However, requiring combined reporting or imposing an alternative minimum tax are not signifi cant; and rules nullifying the use of passive investment companies surprisingly have a negative (marginally signifi cant) association with SCIT revenues. Our results suggest that some of these policies are also economically signifi cant. For example, the use of a throwback rule is associated with roughly 16 percent higher SCIT collections, and expanding the tax base using a broader defi nition of business income is associated with 15-21 percent higher SCIT revenues.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefl y describes state tax policies generally and variations enacted in some of those policies over the past two decades. This is followed by a review of prior research and a description of our research design and the results, including an analysis of the economic signifi cance of the key SCIT policies on revenues. A brief summary concludes the paper.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND

State Tax Policies
As illustrated in Figure 2 , states make a number of tax policy choices that can infl uence the amount of corporate income tax revenues collected. First are items that affect the measurement of the tax base. For organizations taxed as corporations, most states begin the computation of taxable income with federal taxable income. 2 Idiosyncratic state-level policies then apply so that specifi c types of income are included or excluded, and certain deductions are allowed or disallowed. For example, all states require the add-back of state income taxes deducted on the federal return. Likewise, a number of states do not permit net operating loss (NOL) carry-backs to offset prior year income. These adjustments tend to increase the state's tax base. On the other hand, some states allow a full or partial deduction for federal income taxes in arriving at state taxable income, which signifi cantly reduces the SCIT base.
For multi-state firms, an important distinction exists between the types of income that are apportioned among the states in which the fi rm operates (i.e., typically "business income"), and the types of income that are allocated to the state in which the income is earned (i.e., interest income, certain non-operating gains and losses, etc.). We discuss the apportionment of business income in more detail later.
Another policy that affects the size of the tax base is the treatment of members of an affi liated group, particularly when one or more members are located in different states. So-called "unitary" states treat all affi liated corporations as a single entity and mandate combined reporting, under which allocable and apportionable income (as well as the apportionment factors) is summed across all fi rms in the group and the income taxable to the state is computed as though the group were one taxpayer. In 2002, at the end of our sample period, 14 states required combined reporting of all unitary businesses, 21 states prohibited combined reporting, and the remaining states allowed it at the option of the taxpayer or the state (CCH, 2004) . The combined reporting requirement is designed to remove the advantage that a fi rm might gain by shifting profi ts to affi liates located in low-tax states, mostly Nevada or Delaware, using techniques such as transfer pricing, passive investment companies (PICs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), 3 or inter-company loans (Smith, 2000; McIntyre, Mines, and Pomp, 2001; Mazerov, 2007b; Sheppard, 2007; Sontag, 2008) . Combined reporting potentially brings more out-of-state income into the tax base although, if outof-state affi liates incur losses, it could also reduce the amount of income apportioned to a unitary state. A less sweeping policy aimed at preventing income shifting is denying deductions for interest and royalties paid to affiliated corporations, particularly PICs. In recent years, some states have enacted such a prohibition. Furthermore, some states have enacted an alternative minimum tax similar to that at the federal level. 4
The Apportionment Formula and the Throwback Rule
The apportionment formula is a key feature of the SCIT that is used to subdivide multi-state fi rms' income among jurisdictions with which the fi rms have suffi cient contact (i.e., "substantial nexus"). 5 In general, business income is apportioned among states based on the proportions of sales and payroll that occur, and the property that exists, within each state. The logic of the formula is that a weighted application of these factors produces a fair refl ection of income, and hence the SCIT, attributable to each state. Under the formula, a multi-state fi rm's income tax liability, x, in state i is computed as:
where π is apportionable income; r i is the statutory tax rate in state i; p i , l i , and s i are the fi rm's property, payroll, and sales within state i, while P, L, and S are the fi rm's total property, payroll, and sales; and w i P , w i L and w i S are the factor weights in state i for property, payroll, and sales, respectively, that must sum to one. Thus, the term in the square brackets captures the percentage of a fi rm's apportionable income that is taxable in state i.
Historically states have placed equal weights on all three factors. However, since the U.S. Supreme Court's 1978 Moorman decision upheld the constitutional validity of Iowa's single-factor apportionment formula based solely on sales, states have increasingly begun placing greater weight on the sales factor. 6 Increasing the sales factor weight while correspondingly decreasing the property and payroll factor weights decreases the SCIT burden on in-state fi rms that ship a substantial proportion of their sales out-of-state. 4 States that have enacted laws that prevent the shifting of income through PICs include: CT in 1998; OH in 1999; AL, MA, MS, and NC, all in 2001; and NJ in 2003 . States that adopted the AMT include: CA, FL, IA, ME, MN and NY, all in 1987. 5 The U.S. Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, Chairman, Mississippi State Tax Commission [430 U.S. 274 (1977) ] identifi ed "substantial nexus" as one of the four prongs that must exist for a state to possess the jurisdiction necessary under the U. 992 (1993) ] in which the court held that a foreign corporation, one that had no tangible property or employees in the state (i.e., no physical presence) but had licensed its intangibles to generate royalty income, had established suffi cient nexus to be subject to the SCIT. 6 Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 98 S.Ct. 2340 (1978 .
On the other hand, such factor weight changes increase the tax burden for outof-state fi rms that ship to locations within the state, assuming that such fi rms have substantial nexus within the state. 7 Consider an example. If State A imposes an equally-weighted apportionment formula, Firm X, with 80 percent of its property and payroll but only 20 percent of its sales located in State A (i.e., an "in-state" fi rm), would have [1/3*(0.8) + 1/3*(0.8) + 1/3*(0.2)] or 60 percent of its apportionable income taxed in State A. If State A chooses to double-weight the sales factor, while decreasing to 25 percent each the payroll and property factors, [1/4*(0.8) + 1/4*(0.8) + 1/2*(0.2)] or 50 percent of Firm X's apportionable income would be taxed in State A. Further, under a 100 percent sales apportionment scheme, only 20 percent of Firm X's apportionable income would be subject to tax in State A. Opposite effects would occur for a firm with a smaller percentage of property and payroll but a larger proportion of its sales located in State A (i.e., an out-of-state fi rm). Firms thus have an incentive to locate the bulk of their property and payroll in states that place a relatively low (or zero) weight on the property and payroll factors. When a state increases the sales factor weight, the expected short-run effect is to collect less SCIT revenue from in-state fi rms and more revenue from out-of-state fi rms, although it is diffi cult to predict which effect will dominate. In the long run, however, lower weights on the property and payroll factors may provide an incentive for new or mobile fi rms to locate within the state, boosting the states' economy and over time bringing in additional tax revenues not only from corporate taxes but also from property taxes, sales taxes, and individual income taxes. Figure 3 illustrates the changes that have taken place in states' apportionment formulas during the time span covered by our data, with the trend clearly away from equally weighting the factors. In 2002, only 11 states used the equally-weighted apportionment formula, down from 34 states in 1982. In contrast, in 2002, 27 states used a greater than one-third weight on sales compared with eight states in 1982, and 7 See footnote 5 above. Year Sales factor weight is 1/3 Sales factor weight > 1/3 and < 1 Sales factor weight is 100%
Number of states
fi ve states applied a single-factor formula based 100 percent on sales, with most of the changes coming in the 1990s. Related to the apportionment weights is the defi nition of what is included in each factor, and where property, payroll and sales are sourced. With sales of goods, most states use the destination rule, i.e., sales are deemed to occur in the state to which the goods are delivered. If the fi rm does not have nexus in the destination state, 8 those sales are not included in the numerator of the apportionment formula for any statethey are called "nowhere sales," and they cause some portion of the fi rm's income to escape taxation by any state. To counteract this perceived problem, some states have enacted a throwback rule requiring that nowhere sales be "thrown back" to the state of origin and included in the numerator of the sales factor in such state. The inclusion of sales shipped to non-nexus states can increase the proportion of a fi rm's income apportioned to and taxed by the throwback state, thereby increasing that state's revenues. 9 In 2002, 24 states had throwback rules while 20 states did not. 10 Notably, 18 out of the 20 states without a throwback rule also placed a greater than 50 percent weight on the sales factor. Figure 4 shows crosstabulations of states' use of the throwback rule with their use of either equal factor weights or heavier weight on sales in the apportionment formula for tax year 2002.
Rates and Credits
Once the tax base is defi ned and apportioned, tax liability is computed using statutory tax rates. States differ not only in Throwback Rule: In determining to which state sales should be assigned in apportioning the income of a multistate corporation, states typically use the "destination test," which assigns to the numerator receipts from sales of tangible personal property if the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the U.S. government, located in the taxing state. If the taxpayer is not taxable in the destination state, the throwback rule assigns such receipts to the numerator of the sales factor of the origin state (the state from which the goods were shipped). WV actually has a throwout rule, in which sales to states in which the taxpayer is not taxable are thrown out of the denominator in computing the sales ratio.
8 Public Law 86-272 establishes the minimum presence or "nexus" required by a corporation in a state before it can be subject to its corporate income tax for profi ts earned in that state. However, P.L. 86-272 does not apply to profi ts from intangible property or provision of services. 9 With respect to services, Swain (2008) argues that the sales component of the apportionment formula should be based upon the destination of service delivery, not the location of service performance, and discusses the implications of this proposal for the throwback and nexus concepts. 10 The throwback rule does not apply to states without a true SCIT (i.e., Nevada, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming). Nebraska had a throwback rule until its repeal in 1995 and Michigan repealed its throwback rule in 1998. West Virginia, included in the 24 throwback states, maintains a "throwout" rule to exclude nowhere sales from the denominator as well so that the sum of the apportionment percentages for each fi rm is one.
the top statutory rate imposed on corporations, but also in whether they use a fl at or progressive tax rate schedule. 11 Various credits or incentives may also be offered to taxpayers. During the last two decades, states have signifi cantly increased the number of investment-related tax credits, such as enterprise zone credits, new facilities credits, corporate headquarters (relocation) credits, etc. The immediate effect of such incentives is to reduce the amount of tax revenues collected but, because such incentives lower the tax cost of doing business in the state, future revenues may increase if new businesses come into the state. In summary, states' corporate income tax regimes differ from each other along many dimensions, from simple differences in statutory tax rates to a multitude of differences in determining the tax base and tax liability. As might be expected, this lack of conformity imposes higher compliance cost burdens (Gupta and Mills, 2003) , but the overall economic and revenue effects remain a source of controversy. Mazerov (2003a Mazerov ( , 2003b argues, however, that denying deductions for interest and royalties, clarifying the defi nition of business income, enacting a throwback rule and disallowing a net operating loss carryback are four policy changes that could meaningfully stem erosion of the SCIT base. These and other such claims are motivating an emerging body of research, including our study.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Prior research on the effects of SCIT policy examines three broad issues: 1) the effects of SCIT on economic growth and development, 2) the tax-planning responses by fi rms to differences in states' policies, and 3) the revenue impacts of various tax policy variables, especially the apportionment formula (Hofmann, 2002; Martens-Weiner, 2006 ). The first group includes several recent studies that seek to determine whether, and to what extent, state employment levels or capital investment are infl uenced by the SCIT, particularly variations in the weights placed on the apportionment factors (Weiner, 1996; Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003) . This empirical evidence is mixed and the statistically signifi cant effects are usually of modest economic magnitude, similar to the conclusions drawn from earlier studies with generally weaker research designs (Wasylenko, 1997) . 12 The second group of studies, those examining tax planning responses to state tax regime differences, has had more success. In state-aggregated data, Klassen and Shackelford (1998) fi nd that companies appear to structure their shipments strategically in order to reduce sales in states that apply a higher weight on the gross receipts factor. Similarly, using fi rmlevel data, Gupta and Mills (2002) fi nd that fi rms' state effective tax rates fi rst decrease and then increase based on the number of states in which they operate, consistent with the strategic use of tax regime differences, especially the apportionment formula, to lower their tax burdens. The inference from both studies is that differences in state tax regimes can potentially cause overall state tax revenues to decline. 11 As a practical matter, progressive tax rates are of little consequence since the top statutory marginal rates are reached at fairly low income levels. 12 To illustrate, Lightner (1999) studies employment changes from 1994-1995 and fi nds that low income tax rates, rather than factor weights, spur employment growth. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) , however, fi nd that the apportionment formula, rather than the tax rate, is more infl uential. Weiner (1996) fi nds that formula apportionment has no independent effect on capital-labor ratios across states in 1990, and only a modest and marginally signifi cant effect on capital spending when examining changes in apportionment formulae from [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Using state-aggregated data from 1983-1996, Gupta and Hofmann (2003) fi nd that the SCIT burden on property, measured as the product of the tax rate and the property factor weight, exhibits a signifi cant negative effect on new capital expenditures but, as in Weiner's (1996) study, the economic magnitude is modest.
In the third category, some researchers have explored the potential revenue effects of variations in SCIT policy, utilizing a variety of research methods. Mazerov (2001) uses a case study, descriptive employment and other economic statistics, and anecdotal evidence to infer that the change to a single-sales-factor apportionment formula does not necessarily result in more jobs, and likely results in reduced state tax revenues. Edmiston's (2002) simulations show that states with market economies gain revenues after moving to a single-factor sales formula, while production regions (i.e., those with high concentrations of payroll and property relative to sales) generally suffer revenue losses. Using data from a sample of corporate income tax returns, Edmiston and Arze (2006) estimate a large decline in SCIT collections after Georgia changed its apportionment formula to double-weight sales in 1995. Using a simulated hypothetical fi rm model, Fisher (2002) fi nds that increasing use of tax incentives explains a large portion of the decline in SCIT revenues, although his study is limited to manufacturing fi rms in 20 states. Fox and Luna (2005) examine the effect of the growth in the proportion of fi rms organized as limited liability corporations (LLCs) on SCIT revenues. Currently, almost all states follow the federal policy of allowing LLCs to be taxed as fl ow-through entities, effectively removing their income from the SCIT base. 13 Using a simultaneous equation model to allow for the endogeneity of LLC choice, Fox and Luna fi nd that LLC growth is signifi cant in explaining the SCIT decline, although this result holds only when fi xed effects for time are excluded. Moreover, as they and Cornia et al. (2005) point out, their LLC variable is measured with a substantial degree of error, 14 and hence their results cannot distinguish the effect of LLCs from a secular downward trend in SCIT revenues. They also fi nd that SCIT revenues are increasing in the sales factor weight and combined reporting, but decreasing in tax incentives. However, they do not consider the throwback rule and other tax accounting policy variables. Omer and Shelley (2004) examine the factors that infl uence a state's decision to change its apportionment formula. While they do not formally examine revenue effects, a corollary to their fi ndings is that such changes tend to follow a decline in SCIT revenues, and in turn are followed by a recovery and subsequent revenue increases. Yet recent evidence from individual state experiences seems to contradict both their study and Fox and Luna (2005) . For example, during the three years following its move to a single-sales-factor apportionment formula, Illinois suffered a $200 million loss in SCIT revenues, as well as a decline in manufacturing jobs (McCourt, LeRoy, and Mattera, 2003) . Ohio (Schiller 2002) , Pennsylvania (Hassell and Sanders, 2005) , and Massachusetts (St. George and McLynch, 2003) had similar experiences. 15 Of course, SCIT revenues are infl uenced not only by tax policy but also by macroeconomic factors and fi rms' tax-planning strategies. Using a panel of Georgia tax returns for the years 1992-2002, Cornia et al. (2005) attempt to dissect the changes in SCIT collections into three main components: 13 All states have adopted legislation governing the treatment of LLCs. With the exception of Kentucky and Texas, states follow federal income tax law in their tax treatment of LLCs (CCH, 2005) . For federal tax purposes, two (or more) member LLCs are treated as partnerships and single member LLCs are disregarded as separate entities (i.e., taxed as sole proprietorships), unless the LLC makes an election to be treated as a corporation. 14 Fox and Luna (2005) use the proportion of total businesses organized as LLCs, computed from data reported on LexisNexis which has missing or inconsistent data for several states/years. 15 States considering the possibility of increasing the sales apportionment weight, such as Alabama (Raabe, 2001) , California (Hamm and Verma, 2002; Ross, 2002) , New York (Plattner, 2000) , Arizona and Wisconsin (Martens- Weiner, 2006) , all predict that declines in SCIT revenues will result.
SCIT policies (the top statutory income tax rate, the payroll factor weight, and various exemptions and deductions), macroeconomic factors (GSP, unemployment rate, and the ratio of manufacturing value added to total GSP), and tax planning. The ratio of federal income tax revenue to total corporate profi ts serves as a proxy for major federal tax base changes. They also account for political infl uence with a binary variable for whether the state legislature is under Democratic control. The model's residual is expected to capture the effects of tax planning. Their analysis suggests that economic factors and fi rm tax-planning strategies are more signifi cant contributors to the decline in SCIT revenues than are SCIT policies; only the tax rate and certain tax incentives are signifi cant in their results and, notably, the apportionment factor weight (payroll) is not signifi cant. Despite their important contribution to the literature, Cornia et al. (2005) conclude that, due to the complexity of the relationships between the relevant variables, much work remains to be done to fully understand the factors that drive SCIT revenue. To summarize, the results of prior research are ambiguous as to the effects of state tax policy variables, particularly factor apportionment, on SCIT collections. This ambiguity arises perhaps in part because most studies examine only a few policy variables at a time, or because they ignore the potential endogeneity of these variables with the level of taxes collected. These concerns shape our research design choices and are discussed next.
RESEARCH DESIGN, MODELS AND DATA
From a research design perspective, our overall empirical approach is similar in spirit to Cornia et al. (2005) . Thus, we regress SCIT revenues on state tax regime variables while controlling for federal tax base changes and other general macroeconomic trends. However, our specifi cation differs in important respects. In contrast with their study, 1) we explicitly address endogeneity related to the apportionment formula and tax rates using a two-stage least squares methodology, 2) we consider several additional tax policy variables that distinguish state tax regimes, 16 and 3) we directly capture federal tax planning through organizational form using data on business return fi lings.
Base Regression Model
Our base regression model focuses on two main state corporate tax policy variables-the sales apportionment factor weight and the statutory tax ratebecause these variables have attracted most of the attention of state tax policymakers. 17 We exploit the longitudinal structure of our data to estimate two-way, fi xed-effects regression models that control for both state and year effects and thus minimize the problem of correlated omitted variables. 18 Using subscripts i to index the state and t to index the year, and α i and λ t to capture the state and year fixed effects, respectively, we use two 16 In particular, we include several variables not considered by Cornia et al. (2005) , including cross-state differences in unitary (combined) reporting, throwback rules, and other tax accounting policies, such as net operating loss carryback provisions, defi nitions of business income, and deductibility of federal income taxes. 17 Specifi cally, 24 states changed their apportionment formula weights during the period under observation, some more than once, and 37 states adjusted their tax rates. 18 All of the states have unquantifi able and in many cases unobservable characteristics that will infl uence the level of SCIT collected. These include geographical, political, social, and economic factors that vary across states, but are relatively stable across time and drive the selection of particular SCIT policies. Some of these omitted variables are likely correlated with the variables included in our models, which results in biased coeffi cient estimates. The panel regression technique captures these omitted variables as "fi xed effects," making it possible to eliminate their infl uence by computing changes for each variable relative to its within-state mean. Similarly, year fi xed-effects control for other infl uences that vary across time but are relatively stable across states.
slightly different empirical specifi cations as follows:
where the dependent variable in equation [2] is SCIT revenue scaled by gross state product (SCIT/GSP) and in equation [3] is the natural log of SCIT revenue (LN_SCIT). The choice of the two dependent variables is motivated by the political debate on the SCIT, which is often framed either as a share of GSP or in absolute magnitude terms. Further, both specifi cations have been used in prior studies (e.g., Cornia et al., 2005) , establishing benchmarks for our results. The two main tax policy variables are SALES, defi ned as the weight given to the sales factor in the state's apportionment formula, and TXRATE, defined as the state's top statutory marginal corporate income tax rate. We first estimate the model ignoring potential endogeneity in these variables to compare our results with prior studies. Given the confl icting arguments about the effect of changing the weight on the sales factor on SCIT revenues, we make no prediction about the sign of the coeffi cient on SALES. Consistent with prior research however, we predict a positive coeffi cient on TXRATE.
Although aggressive state tax planning is widely hypothesized to be an important reason for the decline in the SCIT (e.g., Fox and Luna, 2002; Mazerov, 2003a; MultiState Tax Commission, 2003; Mazerov, 2007a) , empirical evidence is scant because, as Cornia et al. (2005) acknowledge, fi nding suitable proxies to capture tax planning is very diffi cult. For example, as discussed before, state tax planning is commonly believed to be accomplished via passive investment companies, also known as "Delaware holding companies," and transfer pricing, but there is no public data source for capturing these effects. However, it is well known that these tax planning strategies are typically implemented using fl ow-through entities, such as partnerships, S corporations or LLCs. To capture these effects, we include the variable FLOTHRU, defi ned as the proportion of fl ow-through federal income tax returns fi led in a state to total business returns fi led, and we expect its coeffi cient to be negative. We construct this variable with data obtained directly from the IRS Master Files on actual tax return fi lings, thus potentially avoiding the measurement problems in Fox and Luna's (2005) LLC variable constructed from the Lexis/ Nexis database. In addition, FLOTHRU does not include single-member LLCs which are "disregarded" for tax purposes, 19 thereby better capturing the key tax planning phenomenon of interestlarge conglomerates using fl ow-through entities to shift income away from the SCIT base. Alternatively, the number of tax returns could be weighted by income to better capture the extent to which fl owthrough entities erode the SCIT base in the economy. However, we did not have that information in the IRS-provided data. Further we believe that FLOTHRU appropriately proxies for the pervasiveness of the use of fl ow-through entities as a tax planning tool while also allowing us to benchmark our results against prior studies (specifi cally, Fox and Luna, 2005) .
Next we control for changes in the federal tax base via FEDBASEGSP, defi ned as estimated federal taxable income reported to the IRS by corporations domiciled within each state scaled by gross state product. 20 This variable accounts for the effects of legislative changes affecting the computation of federal taxable income and the effects of tax planning at the federal level. We expect its coeffi cient to be positive.
Finally, we include two variables to control for general macroeconomic trends: 1) UNEMP, defi ned as the state unemployment rate, as a control for general economic conditions within the state with the expectation that a weak economy is associated with lower SCIT revenues; and 2) LN_POP, defi ned as the natural log of the state's population, as a control for the general size of the state, expecting its coeffi cient to be positive. In the model using LN_SCIT as the dependent variable, we modify the federal tax base variable by dividing its raw value by state population instead of GSP (FED-PERCAP). We also drop LN_POP from the regression and add LN_GSP as an explicit control for the denominator in the dependent variable of the scaled SCIT model. 21
Controlling for Endogeneity in SALES and TXRATE 22
As discussed earlier, tax policies are not randomly assigned. Instead, each state's policymakers likely identify revenue needs and sources differently depending upon historical factors, natural resources, economic opportunities, education systems, political affi liation of elected officials, and other factors. Over time these factors have combined to shape each SCIT system and each SCIT system has likely had an impact on some or all of these factors. More immediately, policymakers consider revenue needs when defi ning the tax base, accounting policies, tax rates, etc. for use in computing state corporate income taxes. Thus, the amount of revenue collected is likely to be endogenous with the tax policy variables, at least initially.
Indeed, statistical tests indicate that SALES and TXRATE are generally endogenous in our data. 23 Hence, we use a twostage least squares approach to replace 20 Estimated federal taxable income (FEDBASE) is computed as federal income tax collections by state grossed up by the top federal marginal tax rate in effect each year. Federal corporate income tax collections for each state are determined according to the address specifi ed on the federal income tax return using U.S. Census Bureau data. 21 Ideally, we would prefer to include the natural logs of FEDBASE, GSP, and state population in the specifi cation of the model using LN_SCIT as the dependent variable. However, the correlation coeffi cients between the three variables are all over 80 percent. Transforming FEDBASE and state population into a ratio (FEDPERCAP) in the model continues to control for the federal tax base while avoiding harmful collinearity. 22 We thank an anonymous referee for stressing the importance of discussing the endogeneity issue as this problem permeates all studies in this area. 23 We used the omitted variable version of the Hausman test (Kennedy, 1998, pp. 150-151) (Omer and Shelley, 2004) .
CORPCOUNT is defi ned as the number of publicly traded corporations in the Com-pustat database that are domiciled within the state in year t-1. We include this variable to capture the potential political infl uence of the corporate community within the state and expect it to be negatively (positively) associated with the tax rate (sales factor weight) variables, although the latter relation may depend on the relative importance of fi rms with higher levels of property and payroll in the state. PIGSP is defi ned as state personal income scaled by GSP and is included to account for the effects of individual wealth within the state on corporate tax policies. Lastly, we include NCORPGSP and CORPLICGSP, defi ned as noncorporate income tax collections scaled by GSP and corporate license fee collections scaled by GSP, respectively, to capture the extent to which the state is able to raise revenues by means other than the corporate income tax. Operationally, we estimate equations [4] and [4a] simultaneously to obtain predicted values of SALES and TXRATE, labeled as P_SALES and P_TXRATE, respectively, which replace the raw values of these variables in re-estimating equations [2] and [3] . As before, we make no prediction as to the sign of the coeffi cient on P_SALES and predict a positive coeffi cient on P_TXRATE.
SCIT Revenues and a Broader Set of State Tax Policies
Our second research objective is to examine the impact on SCIT revenues of a larger spectrum of tax policies that also differ by state, while controlling for endogeneity in SALES and TXRATE. Ideally, we would prefer to simply include the additional tax policies in the state and year fi xed-effects models used in the preceding analysis. However, many of the tax policies of interest are stable across our sample period for a majority of states and would therefore be absorbed into the "fixed effects" for those states. 26 Thus, estimating a regression model that includes state fi xed effects for this analysis would result in "throwing out the baby with the bathwater." Hence, we examine the impact of the expanded set of tax policies on SCIT revenues using a panel regression model that includes only year fi xed effects. Aside from this modifi cation and the inclusion of the additional tax policy variables, the model specifi cations match those of equations [2] and [3], including the dependent variables and the derivation of P_SALES and P_TXRATE from the two-stage least squares process described earlier.
The expanded models are specifi ed as follows:
[5] SCIT GSP We expect the coeffi cients on THRWBK, UNITARY, NONOL, BUSINC, AMT and PIC to be positive because each of these variables has the effect of increasing the SCIT base (or tax liability as in the case of AMT), whereas we expect the coeffi cient of FDTXDED to be negative because it decreases the SCIT base. We also include the number of business tax incentives offered by the state (TXIN-CEN) . 27 States are increasingly using credits and incentives in conjunction with or in lieu of changes in apportionment factor weights or the tax rate to attract businesses to the state (Plattner, 2000; Fisher, 2002) . However, the sign of the coeffi cient on TXINCEN is diffi cult to predict. While the direct effect of these incentives is to reduce SCIT revenues, SCIT revenues may increase if new businesses are attracted to the state or existing businesses are encouraged to expand.
Arguably, all of these tax policies could also be viewed as endogenous in a model of SCIT revenues. However, we do not attempt to address this larger issue due to practical limitations in our ability to instrument for all of these policies together. That said, we do not believe that omitting endogeneity controls for these particular policies is likely to materially impact our results. For most states, the basic tax regime has been in place for many decades. As mentioned before, there are few if any current changes to the policies such as throwback, unitary, deductibility of federal income tax, etc. Thus, State A's requiring combined reporting may be related to its revenue situation 50 years ago, but is not necessarily a function of this year's or last year's SCIT collections. Nevertheless, the lack of time series variability does not overcome the fact that this omission remains a limitation of our study.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We collected data from a variety of sources on the 43 states with a SCIT for the entire 21-year period, 1982-2002 . We excluded Nevada, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming because they do not have a SCIT, as well as Michigan and Texas because their corporate tax is not strictly based on income. We also excluded Alaska because, although Alaska collects a SCIT, its revenue data mixes severance taxes with income taxes. Table 1 summarizes all variable defi nitions and the data sources used to construct each variable. Table 2 reports the distribution of the variables based on the 903 stateyear observations (43 states × 21 years). The mean (median) SCIT revenue as a percent of GSP is about 0.4 percent (0.3 percent), although it has trended lower over time as shown in Figure 1 . The mean (median) 27 Ideally we would like to capture the dollar amount of tax relief provided by corporate business tax incentives.
We attempted to collect this data by examining state-by-state tax expenditures via a set of web links compiled by Michael Mazerov. While we found that availability of these data is increasing over time, it is not consistently available throughout our sample period. Further, these incentives vary widely in the tax base to which they apply, the rates at which they are allowed, and their qualifi cation criteria. Thus, we acknowledge that, at best, the TXINCEN variable serves as a rough proxy for tax relief, with a high count implying a legislative climate sympathetic to business (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003) . sales factor weight on average during the sample period is 45 percent (33 percent), consistent with an increasing number of states placing a greater than one-third weight on the sales factor as shown in Figure 3 ; the mode, however, remains at 33 percent. The mean and median top statutory SCIT rate is 7.6 percent during our sample period and ranges from a low of 4 percent to a high of 12 percent.
Over one-half (56.7 percent) of the stateyears include a throwback rule and 29 percent of the state-years have a requirement for unitary reporting. Nearly one-half (49.6 percent) of the state-years include a disallowance for NOL carrybacks to prior tax years. Further, 11.6 percent of the state-year observations include an expanded defi nition of business income and 12.5 percent of the observations have deductibility of federal income taxes on SCIT returns. 10.7 percent of state-years have an alternative minimum tax and 1.9 percent of sample observations have laws to nullify tax avoidance through passive investment companies. On average, states provided slightly more than 10 businessrelated tax incentives during the sample period, ranging from a low of three incentives to a high of 15. 28 Finally, over one-half (57.6 percent) of all business returns fi led in the states were from fl ow-through entities, from a low of nearly 28 percent within one state-year to a high of 82.6 percent. Table 3 presents correlation coeffi cients (Pearson correlations are in the upper diagonal and Spearman rank correlations are in the lower diagonal) for the tax policy variables. The primary concern is to ensure that the tax policy variables under examination are not so highly correlated with each other as to make it diffi cult to parse out their independent effects in the regression model. The highest correlation magnitudes are 0.41 between BUSINC and AMT and between BUSINC and THRWBK and 0.39 between THRWBK and UNITARY. All other pairwise correlations among the tax policy variables are below 0.35. Beyond the tax policies, a number of correlation coeffi cients among the control variables and instruments (not tabulated) are above 0.40, with the highest being between CONTROL and LEGPTY (0.73 on both diagonals) and between CONTROL and GOVPTY (0.68 on both diagonals). However, only fi ve other pairwise correlation coeffi cients are above 0.50, the highest being 0.64 between FEDPERCAP and CORPLICGSP. Overall, there does not appear to be cause for concern about harmful collinearity in the data, but we do address some of the highest correlations in our sensitivity analysis. Table 4 reports the results of the fi rststage models specifi ed in equations [4] and [4a] to estimate P_SALES and P_TXRATE. The models have within R-squared values of between 18 percent and 34 percent. All fi rst-stage models have overall statistical signifi cance at less than the 0.01 level, and several of the instruments/second stage exogenous variables are signifi cant in each of the models. Table 5 reports the results of the twoway fi xed-effects regression models of SCIT revenues. Panel A presents results for equation [2] , which uses SCIT/GSP as the dependent variable (hereafter, the scaled model), whereas Panel B presents results for equation [3] , which uses the natural log of SCIT revenues as the dependent variable (hereafter, the logged model). In each panel, Column 1 contains the results for equations [2] and [3] without endogeneity controls, whereas Column 2 presents results controlling for endogeneity with two-stage least squares estimation. The reported t-statistics are based on Huber-White robust standard errors and their statistical signifi cance is based on two-tail critical values.
RESULTS
Results for the Base Regression Model with Controls for Endogeneity
Focusing fi rst on the Column 1 results, we fi nd that the models are statistically signifi cant overall (p < 0.01) with within R-squared values of 41 percent and 75 percent for the scaled and logged models, respectively. Consistent with some prior studies (Fox and Luna, 2005) , the coeffi cient on SALES is positive and signifi cant at the 0.10 level (0.15 level) in the scaled (logged) specifi cation, indicating that SCIT is increasing in the sales factor weight. The results for both models also suggest that the SCIT is increasing in the top statutory marginal rate (p < 0.01) as expected.
Regarding the control variables, FLOTHRU is negative and signifi cant at less than the 0.01 level in both specifi cations, consistent with tax planning via the use of fl ow-through entities having a negative impact on the SCIT base. 29 UNEMP is also negative and signifi cant at less than the 0.01 level in both models. LN_POP and LN_GSP are both positive 29 Of course, organizational form choice could be driven by reasons other than tax planning. Notes: Pearson (Spearman) correlation coeffi cients are shown in the upper (lower) diagonals. Two-tailed p-values are shown below the correlation coeffi cients. See Table 1 for variable defi nitions. Notes: ***, **, and * indicate signifi cance for a two-tailed test at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. See Table 1 for variable defi nitions. and signifi cant (p < 0.01) in their respective models as expected. Finally, the federal tax base variable is not signifi cant in the logged specifi cation but is positive and signifi cant at the 0.10 level in the scaled model. Column 2 of each panel of Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates for equations [2] and [3] where SALES and TXRATE are instrumented through a twostage least squares process to control for potential endogeneity. To test the important assumption of "good instruments" (instruments that are orthogonal to the error term), we perform Hansen's (1982) over-identifi cation test. The p-values of the Hansen J-statistic are 0.11 and 0.24 for the scaled and logged specifi cations, respectively, indicating that the null hypothesis of orthogonality between the instruments and the error term cannot be rejected. Both models are again statistically signifi cant overall (p < 0.01), and the within R-squared values are 22 percent and 64 percent for the scaled and logged models, respectively.
While the two-stage least squares results for TXRATE remain consistent with those reported above, the results for SALES change materially. When instrumented through a fi rst-stage model, the sales factor weight (P_SALES) becomes negative and signifi cant at the 0.05 level in both specifi cations. Thus, corrected for endogeneity, a higher weight on the sales factor is actually associated with lower SCIT revenues, consistent with anecdotal evidence (Schiller, 2002; McCourt et al., 2003; St. George and McLynch, 2003; Hassell and Sanders, 2005) and evidence based on Georgia tax returns (Edmiston and Arze, 2006) . The instrumented version of the statutory tax rate variable (P_TXRATE) remains positive and signifi cant in both specifi cations (at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels in the scaled and logged models, respectively), suggesting that the documented positive association between SCIT revenues and the top statutory tax rate is robust to controls for endogeneity. The results for the control variables are consistent with those reported in Column 1 of each panel.
Results for a Broader Set of State Tax Policies
Tables 6 and 7, respectively, present the fi rst and second stage results for the year fixed-effects regressions modeled in equations [5] and [6] . The focus of this analysis is an examination of the impact of a broader spectrum of tax policy variables on SCIT revenues. 30 As before, the first-stage model results presented in Table 6 are used to estimate P_SALES and P_TXRATE. The models have adjusted Rsquared values of between 40 percent and 46 percent, overall statistical signifi cance at less than the 0.01 level, and several of the instruments/second stage exogenous variables are signifi cant in each of the models.
The second stage results in Table 7 are highly signifi cant overall (p < 0.01), and the within R-squared values are 37 percent and 92 percent for the scaled and logged models, respectively. Beginning with the sales apportionment factor weight, the coefficient on P_SALES is negative and signifi cant at less than the 0.01 level in both specifications of the model, similar to the two-stage least squares results reported in Table 5 . The coeffi cient on P_TXRATE remains positive as in the preceding analysis and is highly signifi cant (p < 0.01) in both models. t-stat 10.63*** -2.86*** -1.25 0.71 1.36 7.27*** 1.81* 6.57*** -0.63 -7.72*** 3.60*** 2.38** 5.96*** 10.23*** -0.93 -1.55 1.17 -3.87*** 3.14*** 2.91*** -7.71*** (p < 0.01) Notes: ***, **, and * indicate signifi cance for a two-tailed test at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. See Table 1 for variable defi nitions.
The results for the other tax policies are generally consistent with their expected effects on SCIT. Specifi cally, the coefficient on THRWBK is positive and highly signifi cant (p < 0.01) in both specifi cations, consistent with this policy increasing the SCIT base. Similarly, disallowance of net operating loss carrybacks (NONOL) is signifi cant at the 0.05 (0.10) level in the scaled (logged) model, and the inclusion of irregular transactions in the defi nition of business income (BUSINC) is positive and signifi cant (p < 0.01) in both models. Also as expected, the coeffi cient estimate on FDTXDED, which decreases the SCIT base, is negative and signifi cant (p < 0.05) in both versions of the model. Surpris-ingly, the coeffi cient estimate on PIC is negative and marginally significant in both models (p < 0.10), but it is diffi cult to draw an inference for this variable because this policy is employed in less than two percent of sample state-year observations. Required combined reporting (UNI-TARY) has a positive coeffi cient in both specifi cations but is signifi cant in neither model. 31 Finally, AMT and TXINCEN are insignifi cant in both versions of the model.
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with those reported in Table 5 with two exceptions: 1) the coeffi cient on FEDPERCAP becomes significant (p < 0.01) in the predicted direction Notes: ***, **, and * indicate signifi cance for a two-tailed test at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, using robust standard errors. P_SALES and P_TXRATE are the two-stage least squares predicted values of SALES and TXRATE, respectively, from the fi rst stage regressions reported in Table 6 . See Table 1 for other variable defi nitions.
in the logged specifi cation, and 2) UNEMP is no longer signifi cant.
Economic Signifi cance of the Effects of State Tax Policies on SCIT Revenues
To evaluate the economic signifi cance of the above results, we calculate the magnitudes of the effects of the various tax policies on SCIT revenues, based on the coeffi cients reported in Table 7 . 32 Starting with the two main policy variables, we find that states with a sales factor weight of one-half relative to one-third experience on average 16 percent (18 percent) lower SCIT revenues in the logged (scaled) model, while a one percentage point higher statutory tax rate is associated with 11 percent (12 percent) higher SCIT revenues on average in the scaled (logged) models. 33, 34 With respect to the other tax policies, we fi nd that states that employ a throwback rule have roughly 16 percent higher SCIT revenues. Similarly, states prohibiting the carryback of net operating losses have four percent higher SCIT revenues, and states expanding the tax base by including irregular transactions in the defi nition of business income have approximately 15 percent (21 percent) higher SCIT collections in the scaled (logged) model. Conversely, states that allow a deduction for federal income taxes paid, thereby reducing the SCIT base, have roughly 8 percent (10 percent) lower SCIT revenues in the scaled (logged) model.
The above results indicate that several of the broader tax policies have materially significant associations with SCIT revenues. In particular, our results for the throwback rule, the definition of business income and disallowance of net operating loss carryback corroborate three of Mazerov's (2003a Mazerov's ( , 2003b four suggestions regarding policies that could meaningfully stem erosion of the SCIT base. However, our analysis is subject to the important caveat that these estimates are static calculations derived under ceteris paribus conditions. Consequently, our analysis does not account for dynamic responses to policy changes by taxpayers (i.e., behavioral reactions) or neighboring states (i.e., tax competition), nor does it consider any offsetting effects in other state taxes (e.g., individual income taxes) that may result from changes in corporate tax policies. Accordingly, while these estimated magnitudes are useful in demonstrating that the impacts of several key tax policies are likely economically signifi cant, they should not be interpreted as precise estimates of the revenue effects of changes in these policies. 32 We compute the estimates of economic signifi cance for the scaled and logged models, respectively, as follows:
[ GSP (SCIT / GSP + β) -SCIT ]/SCIT , and [exp(ln(SCIT ) + β) -SCIT ]/ SCIT where SCIT and GSP are the sample mean values (in $thousands) for SCIT revenues ($502,366) and gross state product ($128,525,250) , respectively, and β is the applicable unrounded coeffi cient from Table 7 . To derive the magnitude estimates for SALES, we multiply β in both equations by 17 to fully refl ect the difference between a 33 percent and a 50 percent sales factor weight. Similarly, to derive the magnitude estimates for TXRATE, we divide β in both equations by 100 to refl ect a difference of one percentage point rather than of 100 percentage points. 33 To put this result for P_TXRATE into perspective, note that the mean statutory tax rate in our sample is 7.6 percent. Accordingly, a one percentage point increase in the tax rate would amount to roughly a 13 percent increase in the tax rate for the mean state-year, which would be a substantial tax hike. 34 As previously discussed, these estimates are based on the coeffi cients reported in Table 7 , which control only for year fi xed effects. However, for these two policies, we also compute (for comparison) magnitude estimates based on the coeffi cients reported in Table 5 , which control for both state and year fi xed effects. The results reported in Table 5 suggest similar (albeit slightly stronger) magnitude effects to those reported here. A sales factor weight of one-half relative to one-third is associated with around 19 percent (22 percent) lower SCIT revenues in the scaled model (logged model); and a one percentage point higher statutory tax rate is associated with 11 percent (14 percent) higher SCIT revenues in the logged model (scaled model).
Sensitivity Tests
We perform various sensitivity tests to examine the robustness of our results. First, as discussed previously (see footnote 30), we estimate the two-stage least squares models reported in Table 5 including only year fi xed effects to ensure that, prior to the addition of the other policy variables, the results for P_SALES and P_TXRATE are not driven solely by state fi xed effects. The results for the two variables remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5 . Second, we re-estimate the two-stage least squares models in Tables 5 and 7 omitting CONTROL as an instrument for SALES and TXRATE. This test is motivated by the high correlations discussed previously between CONTROL and two other instruments, GOVPTY and LEGPTY. Our results are qualitatively unchanged by this modifi cation. Third, we re-estimate the models presented in Table 7 omitting TXINCEN. This variable (at best) likely suffers from measurement problems and serves only as a rough proxy for corporate tax relief (as discussed previously in footnote 27). We fi nd that the results for the other policy variables are not affected by the omission of TXINCEN.
Finally, given the importance of combined reporting in determining the SCIT base and recent actions by several states to adopt combined reporting, we further explore the results for the UNITARY variable. Based on its fairly high correlation with THRWBK (0.39), we re-estimate the Table 7 results without THRWBK. In those specifi cations we fi nd that the coeffi cient for UNITARY is positive and signifi cant at the 0.01 level and is associated with about nine percent higher SCIT collections. Although this result is consistent with expectations of a broadly defi ned SCIT base, we believe it is misleading because this specifi cation suffers from a correlated omitted variable bias (THRWBK). When both THRWBK and UNITARY are included in the model as in Table 7 , THRWBK has a signifi cant effect on SCIT revenues, but UNITARY does not. Another explanation for this result we explored was the likelihood that the effect of UNITARY may be subsumed within FLOTHRU because an important motivation for combined reporting is to prevent the transfer of income among affi liates located in zero (or low) tax states. However, we fi nd that the correlation between UNITARY and FLOTHRU is less than 10 percent and the Table 7 regression results estimated without FLOTHRU do not change the results for UNITARY or the other variables in the model.
CONCLUSIONS
The state corporate income tax (SCIT) has been under increasing attack for some time because of its declining importance as a source of revenues. This decline has led to vigorous debates about the likely causes for the decline and potential remedies to stem the erosion. Confounding the analysis is the activism of many states in modifying the structures of their SCITs to differentiate them from the regimes of other states in attempts to attract/retain economic activity within their borders. In this paper, we focus on the role of differences among state tax policies in determining state revenue collections.
Using aggregate state-level panel data covering the years 1982-2002, we estimate fi xed-effects regression models of SCIT revenues as a function of state tax policies and a variety of controls, including accounting for the endogeneity of apportionment formula weights and tax rates. We fi nd that states with a double-weighted (50 percent) sales factor experience on average 16-18 percent lower SCIT revenues than do states with an equally-weighted (one-third) sales factor, while a one percentage point higher statutory tax rate is associated with 11-12 percent higher SCIT revenues.
We fi nd that several other tax policies also have statistically and economically signifi cant associations with SCIT revenues. As expected, the use of a throwback rule is associated with roughly 16 percent higher SCIT collections, and employing a broader defi nition of business income is associated with 15-21 percent higher SCIT revenues; however, somewhat surprisingly, combined reporting is not significantly associated with SCIT revenues. These fi ndings are robust to a number of alternative specifi cations and sensitivity tests.
Although our results have important implications for the policy debate surrounding the state corporate income tax, caution is warranted in interpreting them, given the limitations of our research design. Our controls for endogeneity as well as for state fi xed effects may be insuffi cient, and it is possible that dynamic, complex interrelationships among the various tax policies may preclude the accurate measurement of any particular policy's impact on SCIT. Further, we have examined contemporaneous and static relationships, and it is possible that a different pattern of revenue collections might emerge in the longer term, as businesses relocate and reconfi gure their multistate operations in response to states' structural changes to the SCIT or as other states respond to neighboring or regional tax competition (Edmiston and Arze, 2006) .
As this paper is written, states continue to struggle with the confl icting goals of raising revenue from corporate income taxes while remaining attractive to business and competing effectively with other states for jobs and capital. For example, 14 states now have a single sales factor apportionment formula (100 percent weight on the sales factor) in effect for 2008 or in the process of being phased in, compared with only fi ve states in 2002 (CCH, 2008) . States readily admit that the primary reason for apportionment formula changes is to remain competitive and to "incentivize" businesses to locate/ remain in the state (Harrie, 2008) . Similarly, the use of tax incentives to encourage business location and employment continues unabated. At the same time, however, more and more states are moving to broaden their corporate tax bases and to thwart strategic tax planning by multistate corporations. For example, 12 states use a defi nition for apportionable "business" income that is broader than that provided by the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), 18 states now require combined reporting with a number of other states currently considering it (Frankel, Nogid, and McLoughlin, 2007; Mazerov, 2007b; Michaelis, Adringer, and Arnold, 2007; Brunori, 2008; CCH, 2008; Sontag, 2008) , and several states are also working on defi ning more broadly what constitutes a "unitary" business for purposes of combined reporting, as well as establishing broader "economic nexus" rules (Sheppard, 2007) . Meanwhile, states continue to experience shortfalls in SCIT revenues, leading to calls for various policy initiatives, such as the thorough review of UDITPA initiated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 35 Others have suggested repealing the SCIT altogether (e.g., Brunori 2002) , or perhaps replacing the current system with a uniform nationwide system administered by the Federal government (Sullivan, 2007) . Assuming states keep their SCIT, the results in this study of the predictable impact of differences in states' tax policies on state tax revenues, together with the inevitable additional compliance cost burden associ-ated with the lack of conformity in state tax regimes (Gupta and Mills, 2003) , suggests that the latter policy prescription has merit.
The results of our study can also inform the current debate in the European Union where the European Commission has put forth extraordinary efforts to fashion a strategy for taxing multinational enterprises so as to create an internal market without tax obstacles (Martens-Weiner, 2006) . In a bold departure from taxing companies on a separate reporting basis, the Commission has proposed the use of a common consolidated corporate tax base and the use of formula apportionment to distribute the tax base across the member countries. The experience of the U.S. states as documented in this and other studies clearly suggests that the E.U. member states would be well served by coordinating their policies, because formula apportionment does not eliminate opportunities for tax avoidance and variations in tax policies may signifi cantly impact revenue collections across the member states.
